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I. INTRODUCTION
Addressing the National Press Club, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture stated,
"With all that technology has to offer, it is nothing if it's not accepted. This boils
down to a matter of trust. Trust in the science behind the process, but particularly
trust in the regulatory process that ensures thorough review-including complete and
open public involvement."' The concomitant effect of a lack of faith in science upon
the acceptance of science is especially evident in the backlash against genetically
altered foods in Europe. In reaction to the fear generated by the outbreak of madcow disease? in the early 1990s, European consumers have a great lack of trust for
additives, modem livestock-feeding techniques, and biotechnology in general.3
The United States exports more goods to the European Union (EU) 4 than it does
to any other singular trading entity.5 The crux of the trade dispute between the EU
and the United States regarding genetically modified crops is the lack of a consistent
and reliable regulatory process for the approval of genetically altered agricultural
commodities. Nearly half of the soybeans and a third of the corn grown in the
United States is genetically altered.6 The EU's refusal to allow the importation of
such a considerable portion of the United States' agricultural production results in
huge economic losses.7 The U.S. Department of Agriculture has approved fifty plant
varieties, termed Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO), for use within the United
States. In contrast, the EU has only approved eighteen GMOs. When the EU failed
to approve any GMOs for over a year, U.S. representatives claimed that the EU was

1. Dan Glickman, Remarks of the United States Secretary of Agriculture to the National Press Club (July
13, 1999), at http:llwww.usda.gov/newslreleases/1999/0285.
2.
See Cow Crunching:BSE/Neiv Evidence on Mad Cows, Economist, Aug. 31, 1996,49,49 (reporting
that an estimated 500,000 cows were infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad-cow disease) and eaten
before the epidemic was discovered). The infection was spread by feeding the ground-up remains ofcattle and sheep
to other cattle. Id. It is strongly suspected that the infection of a number of people with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
is linked to the consumption of this tainted beef. Id.
3.
Steven H. Dunphy, The WTO: A Case of Washington Meat andFrenchMustard. How One Big Beef in
World Trade Trickles Down to Folks on the Farm, SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999, at A1.
4.
The European Union (known also as the European Community) consists of the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, and Finland. Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Dilemma of the European Union:Balancing the Power
of the SupranationalEUEntity Againstthe Sovereignty of its IndependentMember Nations,9 PACE INT'L L. REv.
111,113 (1997).
5.
See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (describing the significance of the trade relationship
between the United States and the EU).
6.
See Melody Petersen, New Trade Threatfor U.S. Farmers,N.Y.TIMES, Aug.29, 1999, at 1 (explaining
that the 60 million acres of genetically-altered corn and soybeans planted in the United States is equal to the size
of the United Kingdom).
7.
See infra note 112 and accompanying text (noting that in 1998 the United States lost over $200 million
in corn sales alone).
8. See EU/US: WashingtonRecoilsfrom Gene FoodFight,EUR. REP., July28,1999, available at 1999 WL
8306732 [hereinafter Gene Food Fight]; see also Marian Burros, U.S. Plans Long-Term Studies on Safety of
GeneticallyAltered Foods,N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1999, at A18.
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"applying protectionist rules masquerading as food safety claims." 9 The EU insists
that it is regulating the introduction of GMOs into the EU'0 to protect the
environment and the health of its people from unforeseen harms caused by GMOs."
The EU's reluctance to adopt and approve GMOs on an "entity-wide" basis is
a result of the differing levels of concern between its individual member states. 2
This reluctance produces a lack of uniformity by allowing the degree of regulation
concerning GMOs to vary from state to state.13 The conflict between the
supranational EU and the member nations of Europe that comprise the EU confuses
the European public. The people are unsure whether legitimate scientific concerns
or political interests drive the respective actions of their governing authorities. 4 For
instance, a legislative provision of the EU allows countries to reject genetically
modified crops already approved1 5 by the European Commission 16 if the member
country has new evidence of risk. 17 The effect of this provision is that a variety of
standards are permitted in determining what is safe for consumption and the

9.
Gene Food Fight,supranote 8 (noting the statement by the U.S. special trade negotiator, Peter Scher,
that "[t]he E[U]'s approval system is not science-based, not transparent and is highly politicised.").
10. See infra notes 36-74 and accompanying text (discussing the laws enacted by the EU pertaining to
GMOs, and in particular Directive 90/220 and Regulation No. 258/97).
11. See Andrew Pollack, 130 NationsAgree on Safety Rules ForBiotech Food,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,2000,
at 1 (discussing the concerns regarding GMOs, such as, the possibility that herbicide resistant crops might crosspollinate with weeds creating "superweeds" or that gene-altered fish might out-compete other fish for food and
reproductive partners).
12. See Gerald C. Nelson et al., The Economics and Politics of Genetically Modified Organisms In
Agriculture:ImplicationsForWTO 2000,Bulletin 809 (Univ. Of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign College of Agricultural,
Consumer and Environmental Sciences) Nov. 1999, at 58 (describing the differences between the policies of
individual nation members of the EU regarding GMOs).
13. See id. (stating that EU policy would be less ambiguous if regional, rather than national, rules prevailed
concerning the regulation of GMOs).
14. See Who'sAfraidofGeneticallyModifiedFoods?,ECONoMIsT, June 19,1999,15,15 [hereinafter Who's
Afraid?] (referring to the public's lack of understanding ofwhether scientific policy is based upon protecting people
or nations' positions within the world market).
15. See, e.g., Commission Decision 98/293/EC Concerning the Placing on the Market of Genetically
Modified Maize (Zea mays L. T25), Pursuant to Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 1998 O.J. (L 131) 30, available
in EUR-LEX, Document 398D0293; Commission Decision 98/294/EC Concerning the Placing on the Market of
Genetically Modified Maize (Zea mays L. line MON 810), Pursuant to Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 1998 O.J.
(L 131) 33, availableinEUR-LEX, Document 398DO294; Commission Decision 97/98/EC Concerning thePlacing
on the Market of Genetically Modified Maize (Zea mays L.) With the Combined Modification for Insecticidal
Properties Conferred by the Bt-endotoxin Gene and Increased Tolerance to the Herbicide Glufosinate Ammonium
Pursuant to Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 1997 OJ. (L 031) 69, availablein EUR-LEX, Document 397D0098;
Commission Decision 96/281/EC Concerning the Placing on the Market of Genetically Modified Soya Beans
(Glycine max L.) with Increased Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, Pursuant to Council Directive 90/220/EEC,
1996 O.J. (L 107) 10, available in EUR-LEX, Document 396D0281.
16. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (explaining the function of the European Commission in
developing policy and law for the EU); see also infra notes 35-62 and accompanying text (describing the approval
process for a proposal of the European Commission to admit a Genetically Modified Organism).
17. See Council Directive 90/220, art. 16.1-.2, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15,20; see also infra notes 54-57,66 and
accompanying text (discussing the authorization given by European Council Directive 90/220/EEC to any member
country to deny the importation of foods previously approved by the European Commission for trade and production
within Europe).
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environment. This dssortment of conflicting standards creates confusion for
European consumers as to what is actually safe." Further, it is difficult for GMO
exporters to deal with the EU as an autonomous trade entity because of the differing
policies of its member states.' 9 This lack of uniformity undermines the goals of free
trade underlying
the formation of the EU and the World Trade Organization
20

(WTO).

The purpose of forming a trade agreement between countries is to eliminate
barriers to free trade that are created by a lack of uniformity in national policies.2'
In order to facilitate their ability to compete in global trade, individual nations have
formed regional2 2 agreements to remove domestic regulations that discriminate
against trade between countries who are parties to a particular agreement.23 The
agreement that formed the WTO is a truly global trade agreement consisting of 134
member countries and thirty observers, of which both the EU and the United States
are members.24 The goal of the WTO agreement is the same as the goal of regional
trade agreements: the elimination of discriminatory barriers to trade.
Trade agreements allow restrictions on the importation of goods under certain
circumstances.' However, despite the availability of measures that allow restrictions
on the importation of goods, there is a public perception that the drive for free trade
results in a governmental mind-set that ignores the people's legitimate concerns. The
European people are questioning their inability as consumers to enact protective
measures outside of the circumstances defined by their governmental authorities in
the trade agreements.26
The frustration of the European populace is a result of their fear that the longterm consequences of GMOs on the environment and their health is arguably
unknown. This fear is enhanced both by the public's distrust of governmental
authorities and by the public's inability to act outside of regulations prescribed by

18. See Who's Afraid?, supranote 14, at 15.
19. See id. (commenting that the concurrent existence of national and EU regulations results in differing
standards regarding the adoption of GMOs).
20. Id. at 60.
21. See id. (noting that countries once restricted regional trade agreements to removing tariffs and nontariff
barriers, but as these barriers were reduced, attention was given to "hidden" barriers, including government
regulations and industry standards). Harmonization of standards and mutual recognition of each member state's
regulations are techniques used to eliminate these barriers. Id.
22. Examples of such regional agreements include the following: the EU; the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFrA) consisting of the United States, Canada, and Mexico; and the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) consisting of Australia, China, Canada, the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Mexico, the United States, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Chile. Nelson, supra note 12, at 61 n.99.
23. Id. at 60.
24. See Susan George, 'The ProblemIsn't Beef Bananas, CulturalDiversity or the Patenting ofLife. The
ProblemIs the WTO': Leading Development Analyst Susan George on Why the World Trade Talks in Seattle Next
Week Won't Help the Great Majority of People or the Environment, THE GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 24, 1999
availablein 1999 WL 25747614.
25. See infranotes 36-107 and accompanying text (discussing the various systems, regulating GMOs, of the
EU, the United States, and the WTO).
26. See Who's Afraid, supranote 14, at 15.
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these authorities. The enormity of the public outcry arising from the people's
unalleviated fears is affecting and undermining the free, unrestricted trade
envisioned by the WTO and the regional agreements.
The United States has not turned yet to the dispute settlement body of the WTO
the issue of the EU's restrictions on the imports of GMOs. 27 However, the
resolve
to
longer the European restrictions remain in place, without any new evidence that
challenges the safety of GMOs, the greater the chances of a confrontation before the
WTO's dispute settlement body.28
This Comment discusses the controversy surrounding the trade of GMOs. In
particular, this Comment addresses the conflict between the regional trade entities
of the EU and the United States, and its effect on the global trading agreement
embodied by the WTO. Part II outlines the regulations and policies of the EU
regarding GMOs of the EU,29 the United States,30 and the WTO.3 1 Part II examines
the controversy between the EU and the United States over "altered" foods,
exemplified by the Beef-Hormones dispute.32 The BeefHormones case was the first
challenge brought under the authority of the WTO, guided by the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement, and has resulted in the current status of regulation under
the WTO agreement regarding restrictions against "altered" foods. 3 This could soon
change, however. Part IV of this Comment considers the likelihood of change in
light of the emerging appeal of the "precautionary principle" as a rule of
international law relating to the introduction of GMOs into a nation. 4 Finally, Part
V summarizes the detrimental effects upon free trade that will result if the
"precautionary principle" is applied to the trade of GMOs

27. See Gene Food Fight,supranote 8 (stating that the United States has not used the WTO as a "bludgeon"'
to open up the EU's market for GMOs because of concerns about the reactions of European consumers).
28. See Petersen, supra note 6, at 1 (commenting that U.S. trade officials have been unsuccessful in
employing diplomatic efforts to convince European leaders and agricultural ministers to lift the bans on new types
of gene-altered crops).
29. See infra notes 36-74 and accompanying text (explaining the regulatory structure and the conflicts
regarding GMOs within the EU).
30. See infra notes 75-93 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. regulatory authorities and policies
surrounding GMOs).
31. See infra notes 94-107 and accompanying text (describing the regulations that encompass the free trade
of GMOs under the auspices of the WTO, which governs both the United States and the EU as members of the
global agreement).
32. See infra notes 115-58 and accompanying text (focusing on the Beef-Hormones dispute and its
significance in providing requirements to justify any restriction of trade against GMOs).
33. See infra notes 108-58 and accompanying text (detailing the conflict between the United States and the
EU, and the findings of the WTO dispute settlement body with regard to altered agricultural goods).
34. See infra notes 159-85 and accompanying text (discussing the origination of the "precautionary
principle" and the possible implications of its application to the trade of GMOs).
35. See infra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
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II. SPECTRUM OF STANDARDS ALLOWING RESTRICTIONS OF TRADE
A. European Community

EU law3 6 relating to protection of the environment is based on the
"precautionary principle," which mandates that any person or entity that introduces
any substance into the EU must take measures to avoid environmental damage
before it occurs. 37 The two main laws which regulate the marketing of GMOs within
the EU38 are Council Directive 90/220 and Regulation No. 258/97. 39
1.

Directive90/220

Directive 90/220 applies to raw materials, such as corn or soy beans, before
there is any production involved in bringing the foods to market as a finished
product. 40 The main requirements of the Directive are as follows: (1) there must
always be an environmental risk assessment before any GMOs are released either
experimentally or commercially; (2) a designated national authority must give its
consent before any GMOs may be released; and (3) a uniform approval
procedure
41
EU.
the
throughout
established
be
must
releases
for commercial
Before a manufacturer or importer may market a GMO product within the EU,
the party must make a request for authorization to the member state in which the
product will first be sold. 42 A request to place a GMO into the market must include
the scientific name of the GMO as well as any possible risks to human health or the

36. Legislation within the EU is carried out by three legislative institutions. See Terence P. Stewart & David
S. Johanson, Policy in Flux: The European Union's Laws on Agricultural Biotechnology and Their Effects on
InternationalTrade, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 243,252-55 (1999). The European Commission proposes legislation.
Id. The European Council debates the proposed legislation and decides whether or not to adopt it. Id. at 253. The
European Parliament, which contains the only directly elected representatives from the European Community,
mainly serves in an advisory capacity. Id. However, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 granted the Parliament veto
power over legislation concerning consumer protection, health, and other related areas. Id. at 255.
37. Margaret Rosso Grossman, Farmersand the Environment Under the Common Agricultural Policy of
the EuropeanUnion: theAgro-EnvironmentalMeasure in the UnitedKingdom, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 663,666 (1997).
38. Legislation in the European Community is generally issued as either a "Regulation" or "Directive."
Regulations affect the EU as a whole and directly apply to each of the member states. Directives also affect the EU
as a whole. However, a crucial distinction between a Regulation and a Directive is that a Directive must be
implemented through domestic regulation. See George, supra note 4, at 119. This allows each member state to
choose how it will carry out the purpose of the Directive within its own borders. See id.
39. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 54; see also Stewart & Johanson, supranote 36, at 266-67.
40. Stewart & Johanson, supra note 36, at 256 (noting that one of the purposes of Directive 90/220 is to
harmonize the law throughout the EU pertaining to GMOs in their raw form before the food is produced in any
way).
41. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 55-56 (commenting that, under the directive, all deliberate releases of
GMOs into the environment must be reviewed on a step-by-step and case-by-case basis before being approved).
42. See Council Directive 90/220, supranote 17, art. 11.1, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15,18; see also Nelson, supra
note 12, at 56 (explaining that while a GMO that is approved in a member state is automatically approved in any
other member state, most companies register the GMO in each of the member states for marketing purposes).
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environment that could result from releasing the GMO into the environment.43 The
member state that receives the request must examine it to make sure that it follows
the requirements of Directive 90/22044 and then it has ninety days to approve or
deny the release of the GMO.4 5 If the authorities of the member state decide to
approve the release of the GMO, they must submit the information concerning the
possible effects of the proposed GMO and their resulting approval to the European
Commission,46 who will forward it to all of the member states.47
Objections by any of the other member states to the placement of the GMO on
the market must be made to the European Commission within sixty days after each
member state received a copy of the notification of approval.48 If an objection to the
release of the GMO cannot be resolved between the member states, the Commission
delegates consideration of the proposal to a committee consisting of representatives
from each of the member states.49 If the committee determines that a GMO should
not be permitted to enter the market or makes no decision, the Commission submits
the measure to the European Council,50 who must vote upon the measure within
three months.5 The failure of the Council to vote upon the proposal acts as an
approval.52 Directive 90/220 states that once release of a GMO is approved in one
member state, other member states need not be notified of an intent to release the
GMO within their boundaries. 3 Once the product meets the requirements of the

43. See Council Directive 90/220, supranote 17, Annex II, arts. II(A)(1), II(C)(2)(i), IV(c)(1), at 23-26; see
also Stewart & Johanson, supra note 36, at 257 (observing that a risk assessment must be undertaken concerning
any possible effects of a particular GMO upon human health or the environment).
44. See Council Directive 90/220, supranote 17, art. 12.1, at 19.
45. See id. art. 12.2, at 19; see also Stewart & Johanson, supranote 36, at 258 (quoting Directive 90/220's
admonition that a member state "[give] particular attention to the environmental risk assessment" when reviewing
the notification of a manufacturer or importer of a GMO).
46. See supranote 36 (explaining that the European Commission's role is to propose legislation).
47. See Council Directive 90/220, supranote 17, art. 13.1, at 19; see also Stewart & Johanson, supranote
36, at 258 (noting that if the member state that received the request provides its consent to the import or
development of the GMO within the market, that state must so inform the Commission and the other member states).
48. See Council Directive 90/220, supranote 17, art. 13.2, at 19; see also Nelson, supranote 12, at 56; see
also Stewart & Johanson, supranote 36, at 258 (stating that where there is no objection within 60 days the member
state approving the GMO "shall" provide its consent).
49. See Council Directive 90/220, supranote 17, art. 21, at 21; see also Stewart & Johanson, supranote 36,
at 259 (explaining that the Commission will adopt the opinion ofthe committee if the committee favors acceptance).
50. See supra note 36 (explaining that the role of the European Council is to decide whether to adopt
proposals for legislation made by the European Commission).
51. See Council Directive 90/220, supra note 17, art. 21, at21; see also Stewart &Johanson, supranote 36,
at 259.
52. See Council Directive 90/220, supranote 17, at 21; see also Stewart & Johanson, supranote 36, at 259
(noting that if the Council does not reach a decision within three months, the Commission will adopt the proposed
measures, thus allowing the member state who originally sent the notification to grant consent, which is then
applicable throughout the EU).
53. See Council Directive 90/220, supranote 17, art. 13.5, at 20; see also Stewart & Johanson, supra note
36, at 259 (explaining that once the requirements of the approval procedures are satisfied, Directive 90/220 does
not mandate any further notice than that previously required).
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Directive, no member state
may inhibit its placement in the market within the
54
member state's territory.
The only circumstance that allows a member state to "provisionally restrict" an
approved product's placement in the market is when the member state has
"justifiable reasons" 55 to believe that the GMO poses a risk to human health or the
environment.5 6 The Commission considers the argument of the concerned member
state and, within three months, decides whether to approve the provisional
restriction under the same guidelines used for an objection to an initial notification.
The failure to reach a decision acts as an approval of the provisional restriction. 8
2. RegulationNo. 258/97
There is no requirement under Directive 90/220 to further notify other member
states once approval to place the GMO on the market has been obtained.5 9 Due to
this fact it is foreseeable that a product could enter the territory of a member state
without the member state's knowledge that it contains GMOs. The likelihood of this
occurring, however, is minimized by Regulation No. 258/97, also known as "The
Novel Foods Regulation., 60 The Regulation requires the labeling of all foods that
"may" contain GMOs, whether they are processed or unprocessed.6 ' Also included
are foods that do not contain any GMOs but are produced from GMOs 6 GMO
foods must also be labeled if they are changed to the degree that they no longer have
the same make-up of an existing food. 63 Regulation 258/97 only applies to GMO
foods that are placed on the market within the EU. 64 Notably, the Regulation

54. See Council Directive 90/220, supra note 17, art. 15, at 20; see also Stewart& Johanson, supra note 36,
at 259 (observing that Directive 90/220 prohibits all of the member states from taking any action that may "restrict
or impede the placing on the market of products containing, or consisting of, GMOs which comply with the
requirements of [the] Directive").
55. See infranote 68 and accompanying text (describing "justifiable reasons" as new scientific evidence that
a GMO constitutes a risk to "human health and the environment").
56. See Council Directive 90/220, supra note 17, art. 16.1, at 20; see also Stewart & Johanson, supra note
36, at 259.
57. See Council Directive 90/220, supranote 17, art. 16.1-.2, at 20; see also Stewart& Johanson, supra note
36, at 260.
58. See Council Directive 90/220, supra note 17, art. 21, at 21; see also Stewart & Johanson, supra note 36,
at 259 (stating that although the product is already authorized to be placed on the European market, the failure of
the Council to address a provisional restriction by a member state acts as support for the validity of the restriction).
59. See Council Directive 90/220, supranote 17, art. 13.5, at 20.
60. Commission Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L043) 1, 1.
61. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 56. The Regulation does not specify the amount of GMOs within a finished
food that would require labeling, but on October 21, 1999, the Commission approved a requirement that all foods
containing at least 1% of GMOs be labeled. Id.
62. See Commission Regulation 258/97, supranote 60, art. 1(2)(b) at 2.
63. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 56.
64. Commission Regulation 258/97, supra note 60, art. 1(1) at 1.
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imposes no labeling requirements upon EU exporters or producers that export
GMOs outside of the EU.65
3. Lack of Faithin the Regulatory Process
France, Austria, and Luxembourg recently exercised their right under EU law
to freeze the future import of GMOs into their respective countries.66 The
Commission submitted the evidence supporting the provisional restrictions to the
Scientific Committee for Food, the Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition, and
the Scientific Committee for Pesticides for investigation.67 These committees found
no new evidence of risk to human health or the environment.6 Despite these
findings, the Regulation Committee of the European Council issued no opinion

65. See id.
66. Food for Thought: Public Hostility to the Genetic Modification of Crops Risks Slowing Down the
Development of a PotentiallyImportantTechnology---Which is Why More Must be Done to ReassureConsumers,
ECONOMIST, June 19, 1999, at 19; see also Stewart & Johanson, supranote 36, at 266-67 (discussing the utilization
ofArticle 16 of European Community Directive 90/220/EEC by Austria and Luxembourg, which permits a member
country to "provisionally restrict" a GMO that has been previously approved if the member country has "justifiable
reasons" to believe that the product might be a danger to human health or the environment).
67. Austria, and later Luxembourg, claimed that the pesticidal attributes of Monsanto's Bacillus
thuringiensis(Bt) corn, which had been shown to adversely affect the monarch butterfly in a study conducted in
North America, might constitute a risk to "human health and the environment." See Opinion of the Scientific
Committee on Plants on the Invocation by Austria of Article 16 ('safeguard' clause) of Council Directive
90/220/EEC with respect to the placing on the market of the Monsanto genetically modifled maize (MON810)
expressing theBt cryia(b) gene, notification C/F19512-02(Opinionexpressedby the Scientifc Committeeon Plants
on 24 September 1999) http:leuropa.eu.intlcornmldg24/healthlsc/scp/out49_en.htm.1 (visited Nov. 24, 1999)
[hereinafter OpiniononAustria]. It may adversely affect other non-target insects that are subject to predation and/or
increase the resistance of target pests, which could result in an expanding effect on the environment. See id. France
claimed that the resistance of modified oilseed rape to herbicide might spread through cross-pollination with other
vegetation, resulting in adverse effects to "human health and the environment." See Opinion of the Scientific
Committee on Plants,adopted on 18 May 1999, on the Invocation by France ofArticle 16 ('safeguard' clause) of
CouncilDirective90/220/EECwith respectto a geneticallymodifiedoilseedrape notificationC/UK/94/M1/1 (Plant
(visited
GeneticSystemsN. V)-(SCP/GMO/150-final)http:leuropa.eu.intcomnmldg24/healthlsclscplout38._en.html
Nov. 24, 1999) [hereinafter Opinionon France].
68. See Stewart & Johanson, supranote 36, at 267; see also Opinionon Austria, supranote 67, 68 (stating
that no new evidence or "justifiable reasons" exist to permit the restriction for the following reasons: the limited
distance that a significant amount of pollen can travel; the short period of time when there is a juxtaposition of
pollen release and local butterfly reproduction and larval feeding; and the inconclusive nature of the laboratorybased study concerning the monarch butterfly); see also EU Scientists Reject Austrian GM Maize Ban, AGRA
EUROPE, Oct. 22, 1999, at EP4 (referring to the Scientific Committee on Plants' statement that the laboratory study
of the effects of genetically modified pollen upon the monarch butterfly could not be extrapolated into the field and
that the "precautionary principle" of Article 16 of Directive 90/220 is only justified in the absence of concrete
scientific data); see also Opinionon France,supranote 67 (stating that the cross-pollination of glufosinate-resistant
crops with other plants will not result in a predominance of cross-bred glufosinate-resistant plants outside of areas
where glufosinate is used).
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about whether the bans were justified. 69 In the absence of an opinion from the

Council, the restrictions remained legally justified.7 °
On June 25, 1999, the Council recommended that Directive 90/220 be amended
to adopt a precautionary approach that prevents the authorization of a GMO until
there is positive proof that it does not affect human health or the environment. 7' All
the member states of the EU agreed to follow this approach.72 Despite the member
states' assertion that they would enforce the moratorium, seven member states have
simultaneously proposed eleven new GMO products for authorization. 73 As a result
of the inconsistency in enforcement of GMO regulation between the national
governments and the supranational EU government, people have no reliable
information on whether these governmental bodies are protecting consumers or
industry; thus the European public has little confidence in regulatory authorities. 74
B. The United States

The United States has no major laws regulating GMOs. 75 The agencies
responsible for monitoring the safety of GMOs in the United States are the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Food and Drug

Administration (FDA). 6
The APHIS regulates the movement or release into the environment of any
organism that could be a potential plant pest to U.S. agriculture.77 In addition, the
APHIS regulates any new plants introduced into the United States that might have
pathogenic properties affecting other existing plants.7 8 Generally, the APHIS is
responsible for protecting U.S. agriculture from pests or diseases, but is not involved
with processed foods made from or containing GMOs.

69. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 36, at 267 (commenting that although the Commission submitted
a proposal to the Council to have Austria and Luxembourg repeal their bans on GMO corn, the Council failed to
reach a decision on the matter).
70. See id. (noting that the absence of a decision by the Council allowed Austria and Luxembourg to
continue to restrict the import of Bt Corn).
71. See Nelson, supranote 12, at 57.
72. Id.
73. See EU Calls Halt to New GMO Approvals; GeneticallyModified Organisms,AGRA EUROPE, June 25,
1999, at EP1.
74. See ECONOMIST, supranote 66 at 19.
75. Stewart & Johanson, supra note 36, at 247. In fact, the Food and Drug Administration sees no
fundamental difference between foods modified through biotechnology and foods developed through traditional
breeding techniques stating that both are forms of genetic manipulation. See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived
from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22, 984 (1992).
76. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 48.
77. See id. at 48-49 (explaining that any party who wishes to move or field-test a genetically engineered
plant within the United States must submit a permit for review to APHIS, who will conduct a subsequent analysis
of any possible risks to the environment associated with an organism's transport between states or limited release
through field trials).
78. See Stewart & Johanson, supranote 36, at 250.
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The EPA regulates pesticides and organisms with pesticidal properties. 7 In
addition to safely maintaining the public's and the environment's exposure to
pesticides, the EPA attempts to prevent the development of pesticide-resistant
insects or weeds.8 0
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), t the FDA is
authorized to safeguard most foods, including GMOs.82 The FDA asks the party
introducing the product into the American market for assurances that the product is
safe, but the FDA does not require the testing of GMO products.83 The FFDCA
holds the party introducing the product legally responsible, and if the product is
subsequently proven unsafe, that party is subject to criminal prosecution. 4 The
problem with this laissez-faire regulatory system is that even when a company does
not meet its food safety responsibilities, the FDA only takes action after some harm
has resulted." No U.S. agency has the adequate staff or resources to test all of the
genetically modified foods that are introduced into the U.S. market. 86 At most, the
FDA inspects two percent of import shipments and conducts few food-plant
inspections outside of the United States. 7 However, because the FDA has broad

79. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 48. The EPA regulates and sets acceptable levels of pesticide in the
environment and in foods on the market. See Stewart and Johanson, supranote 36, at 249. This includes GMOs that
contain Bt toxin, which acts as a pesticide against the European Corn Borer. See id.
80. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 52. The EPA is concerned that long-term exposure to plants containing the
Bt toxin will, through natural selection, breed insects resistant to the Bt toxin, thereby nullifying the GMO's
effectiveness and again requiring the use of pesticides. See id. at 38.
81. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95. (vest 1994 & Supp. I1997).
82. See Stewart and Johanson, supranote 36, at 248.
83. See Burros, supra note 8, at A18; see also Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the
FederalFood,Drug and Cosmetic Act, 50 FOOD DRUG LJ. 101, 106 (1995) (stating that without self-regulation
it would be impossible for the FDA to monitor the extensive amount of industry for which the agency is
responsible).
84. See Stewart & Johanson, supranote 36, at 248-49; see also Hutt, supranote 80, at 106 (commenting
that in order for a system of self-regulation to work there must be some form of sanction for failure to comply).
85. See Michael R. Taylor, PreparingAmerica's Safety System for the Twenty-First Century: Who Is
Responsiblefor What Wien it Comes to Meeting the Food Safety Challenges of the Consumer-Driven Global
Economy?, 52 FOOD DRUG L.J. 13, 16 (1997); see, e.g., Marc Kaufman, Biotech CriticsCite UnapprovedCorn in
Taco Shells, VASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2000, at A2 (reporting an independent lab's finding of a genetically modified
corn, approved for use in animal feed but denied approval for human consumption because of problems concerning
allergies and human digestion in Taco Bell brand taco shells manufactured in Mexico and sold in grocery stores
throughout the United States). Anti-biotech activists claim that the FDA is forgetting its responsibility to safeguard
the U.S. food supply in its enthusiastic acceptance of GMOs and that this raises questions as to the safety of all
genetically modified foods approved by the FDA. Dale Kasler, TortillaMakerRecallsProducts,SACRAMENTO BEE,
Oct. 14, 2000, at Al. But see Kaufman, supra,at A2 (recounting the statements of biotech industry officials that
Genetic Id, the independent laboratory who made the findings, had been incorrect in their detection of genetically
modified material in a product at least once before). An independent test by Peggy Lemaux, a biotech expert at the
University of California, Berkeley, showed that a person would have to eat "over 100,000" taco shells before
experiencing an allergic reaction. Kasler, supra,at Al.
86. See Burros, supranote 8, at A18.
87. See Taylor, supra note 85, at 27; see also Alexandra Marks, U.S. Poisedfor a Biotech Food Fight,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 171999, at I (observing that while the FDA requires strict tests and procedures
before approving new foods, it only recommends a consultation by biotech companies bringing a GMO to market,
as longas the GMO has not significantly altered the food from its conventional counterpart).
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post-market authority to ensure the safety of foods, most companies voluntarily
consult with the FDA before marketing their products.88 Despite the minimal testing
conducted by the FDA, the United States' food safety system has worked very well
and is internationally respected. 89 Parties tend to adhere to FDA standards because
of the potential legal liabilities and the agency's practice of reviewing information
given by the party introducing a GMO. 90
Contrary to the Regulation within the EU that requires the labeling of any food
containing significantly traceable amounts of GMOs, 9' the FDA only requires
labeling of genetically modified foods if the composition of the food differs
significantly from the food from which it was derived or if it may pose a health
threat.92 The U.S. Congress may consider a bill for the mandatory labeling of foods
containing GMOs, similar to the EU's "Novel Food Regulation." However, the U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture has stated that federal requirements for labeling are
unlikely. 93
C. World Trade Organization
While the United States and the EU are free to govern trade within internal
markets, membership in the WTO subjects both of these regional trade entities to the
WTO Agreement's international trade regulations. 94 A WTO member may impose
stronger safety measures than those required to meet international standards. 95
International standards are defined by the Codex Alimentarius Commission

88. See United States Trade Representative, U.S. Regulation of Products Derived from Biotechnology
http://www.ustr.gov/reports/index.html (visited Nov. 22, 1999).
89. See Taylor, supranote 85, at 28.
90. See id. (noting that most consumers realize that outbreaks of food bome illnesses or other food safety
problems can never be totally eliminated).
91. See supranotes 57-62 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation No. 258/97).
92. See Nelson,supranote 12, at 51. For instance, if a genetically modified food contains a protein from a
nut or some other common allergen, a label must be included to warn people that may be susceptible to an allergic
reaction from ingesting the food. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 36, at 250-51.
93. See James Cox, Bio-foods Backlash: European Biotech Companies, Under Siege for Altering Food
Genes, Warily Watch OppositionGrow in the USA, USA TODAY, Jan. 13,2000, at 2B.
94. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (describing the formation of the regional and global trade
agreements); see also Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex Ia, art. 3, para. 1, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-REuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND

vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]

(emphasizing the necessity for uniform standards). Article 3.1 of the Agreement reads: "To harmonize sanitary and
phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary orphytosanitary measures
on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in
this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3." Id.
95. See David A. Wirth, InternationalDecisions:EuropeanCommunities --Measures ConcerningMeat and
Meat Products.WTO Doc. WYTDS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R. World Trade OrganizationAppellateBody January
16, 1998, 92 A.J.I.L. 755, 758 (1998).

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 14
(Codex), 96 the International Office of Epizootics (O]E), 97 the International Plant
Protection Convention (IPPC),9 ' and other international organizations identified by
the WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.9 9 The establishment
of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement)'0° allows WTO members to impose stronger measures, but only when
there is sufficient "scientific justification" to support a member's determination that
there is a need for stricter standards. 10' This requirement is intended to prevent
agricultural protectionism by a WTO member who may be seeking to evade its free
trade commitments to other member countries.' 0 2 The existence of a verifiable
standard removes the ability of a member country to inhibit free trade by a mere
assertion unsupported by science.
In order to scientifically justify safety measures in excess of international
standards, the SPS Agreement requires a "risk assessment" to evaluate the likelihood
of adverse biological and economic consequences.' 3 The risk assessment must be

96. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and the World Health
Organization (WHO) founded the Codex in 1962 to establish international standards for foods and their relation to
human health. Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organizationand
InternationalOrganizations:The Roles ofthe CodexAlimentariusCommission, the InternationalPlantProtection
Convention, andthe InternationalOffice ofEpizootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'LL. & CoM. 27, 41 (1998) [Hereinafter
Roles ofInternationalOrganizations].The standards may concern additives, contaminants, veterinary drugs, and
pesticide residues in foods. Id. The Codex utilizes committees, made up of delegates from its 162 member countries,
to research and propose standards. Il Then, an eight-step process takes place, which gives members an opportunity
to comment on the proposals. Il
97. The OIE is the oldest veterinary association in the world and is comprised of 151 countries. Id. at 49.
Since 1924, the OIE has set advisory international standards involving the trade of animals and animal products.
Id. Unlike the Codex and the IPPC, the OIE was not created by nor does it act through the authority of the United
Nations. Id.
98. The FAO created the IPPC to oversee and coordinate international efforts with regard to the control of
plant species and related issues. Il at 46. The IPPC was principally established to determine international standards
for plant issues. Id.
99. See Warren MaruyamaA New Pillarofthe WTO: SoundScience, 32 INTr'LLAw. 651,668 (1998) (noting
that Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement requires WTO members to adopt international measures if they exist).
100. SPS Agreement, supranote 92.
101. Wirth, supranote 95, at 757. Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement states:
Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in a higher
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on the
relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a scientific justification,
or as a consequence of the level of protection a Member determines to be appropriate in
accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5. Notwithstanding
the above, all measures which result in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different
from that which would be achieved by measures based on international standards, guidelines or
recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of this Agreement.
SPS Agreement, supra note 92, art. 3, para. 3.
102. Maruyama, supra note 99, at 665.
103. See Wirth, supra note 95, at 758. The SPS Agreement attempts to harmonize the efforts of member
countries in the setting of particularized national or regional standards and article 5.1 states generally: "members
shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the
circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques
developed by the relevant international organisations."
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based on an examination and evaluation of available scientific information.'0° The
test for determining if a risk assessment is sufficient to permit the imposition of a
protective measure is whether there is a "rational relationship" between the measure
and the risk assessment.10 5
A WTO member who provides a sufficient scientific justification to impose a
higher level of protection for the "human, animal or plant life or health within its
territory" is not immune from challenge. If a nation's measures conform to
international standards, the SPS Agreement states that they are "deemed to be

necessary ...
and presumed to be consistent with [the Agreement]."'06 However, the
presumption that international standards are consistent with the level of protection
allowed by the SPS Agreement is rebuttable, and a nation may challenge the
sufficiency of the international standards that presumptively define the maximum
acceptable requirements for the imposition of protective measures.', Therefore,
stricter protective national measures, as justified by a risk assessment, are likely
more susceptible to challenge if applied beyond presumptively acceptable
international standards.

SPS Agreement, supra note 92, art. 5, para.l.
104. See Wirth, supranote 95, at 757. Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement requires consideration of what is
currently scientifically known. See SPS Agreement, supra note 92, art. 5, para. 2. "In the assessment of risks,
Members shall take into account available scientific evidence; relevant processes of specific diseases or pests;
existence of pest-or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine or other
treatment." Id.
105. Steve Chamovitz, Environment and Health Under WTO Dispute Settlement, 32 INT'L LAW. 901, 915
(1998). Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement attempts to harmonize international and individual standards by requiring
reasonableness. See SPS Agreement, supranote 92, art. 5, para. 5. It states:
With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the concept of appropriate level of
sanitary and phytosanitary protection against risks to human life or health, or to animal and plant life
or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be
appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction
on international trade.
Id.
106. Charnovitz, supranote 105, at 913. Article3.2 of the SPS Agreement confirms the validity of a nation's
standards where the nation has adopted international standards. See SPS Agreement, supra note 92, art. 3, para. 2.
as it provides: "Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, guidelines or
recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed
to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this Agreement and of the GATr 1994."
Id.
107. Chamovitz, supranote 105, at 913-14.
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III. CONFLICTING POLICIES

A. Bone of Contention
The EU is working to harmonize standards in an effort to establish a "Single
Market" for the member states 0 5 The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that
the EU's effort will eventually affect fifty percent of U.S. exports to Europe. t 9
Currently, the EU and the United States are one another's single largest trading
partner, each responsible for nineteen percent of its counterpart's exports. 10 Because
the EU's combined population is over 370 million and the U.S. population is 265
million, this trading relationship is vital to their respective economies."i
In 1998, the United States lost $200 million in corn sales alone because of
delays in the EU's approval process for GMOs. 1 2 In a statement to EU officials last
fall, U.S. Commerce Undersecretary David Aaron claimed that because the EU did
not have the scientific grounds to reject products containing GMOs, it had resorted
to "a variety of ploys and political maneuvers to delay and deny" the product's
approval. 1 3 The circumstances surrounding the dispute over GMOs are substantially
embodied by the conflict between
the EU and the United States over the use of
14
production.1
beef
in
hormones
B. The Beef-Hormones Dispute
In 1980, the illegal use of hormones in veal production caused hormonal
irregularities in some European children." 5 The EU then banned the use of
hormones for anything other than therapeutic reasons in an effort to restore

108. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1999 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 217 (1999), available at

http:llwww.ustr.gov/reportsltpal1999/index.html.
109. See id.
110. THE EU COMM. OF THE AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN BELGIUM, Business Guide to EU Initiatives

1998/1999, ch. 10 (1998), LEXIS, Europe Library, EUTINIT File [hereinafter BUSINESS GuIDETOEUINrrATiES
1998/1999]. Trade between the EU and the United States supports an estimated six million jobs. Id.
111. George, supranote 4, at 112 n.6; see also Nelson, supranote 12, at 1 (commenting that in 1998, the EU
imported $1.5 billion worth of soy products from the United States).
112. BUSINESS GUIDE TO EU INrrATIVES 1998/1999, supra note 110, at ch. 10.
113. James Cox, supranote 93, at 2B (quoting Undersecretary Aaron's assertion that GMOs are so safe that
"not one sneeze, not one cough, [and] not one rash" has been caused by them).
114. See Roles ofInternationalOrganizations,supra note 96 at 34-35 (noting the claims of North American
cattle producers that there was no scientific foundation for banning the import of hormone-treated beef). U.S. cattle
producers claimed the ban was a protectionist measure for EU beef producers. See id. In opposition, the EU stated
that beef hormones "might" threaten human health and that science supported its position. See id.;see also Stewart
and Johanson, supra note 36, at 290 n.370 (comparing the similarity of a dispute concerning GMOs under the SPS
Agreement with the Beef-Hormones dispute).
115. Particularly the use of diethylstilbene (DES) which, in some instances, caused babies to develop breasts
and begin menstruation. Layla Hughes, Note, Limiting the Jurisdictionof Dispute Settlement Panels:The WTO
Appellate Body Beef Hormone Decision, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 915,916 (1998).
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consumer confidence in the beef market.'t 6 In 1995, the United States and Canada,
as members of the WTO, employed the dispute settlement proceedings provided
under the SPS Agreement to successfully challenge the EU's ban on beef produced
with hormones.' 17
1. Burden of Proof
The allocation of the burden of proof may be determinative of a party's ability
to show whether or not a heightened measure is valid under the SPS Agreement."1 8
The complaining party must first establish a prima facie case of an inconsistency
with the SPS Agreement.' t9 In order to meet the burden of proof, the Dispute
Settlement Panel (Panel) 120 in Beef-Hormones required that the complaining party
sufficiently demonstrate a violation of the SPS Agreement.12 ' Satisfying this initial
burden creates, what the Appellate Body 22 has termed, a "presumption."'12 A
presumption that a violation has occurred must be rebutted by the responding
party. 24 The Appellate Body rejected the Panel's finding that when the member
country's standards exceeded international standards, the initial burden of proof
shifted to the party defending an SPS measure., 5 The Appellate Body believed that
the ability of a member to choose its own "appropriate level of protection" is an
"important right" embodied in the SPS Agreement and that this right would be

116. lain Sandford, HormonalImbalance? Balancing Free Trade and SPS Measures After the Decision in
Hormones, 29 VUWLR 389, 404 (1999).
117. Wirth, supranote 95, at 755; see also Maruyama, supranote 99, at 672.
118. See Sandford, supranote 116, at 407-08 (explaining that a member state has the right to establish height
measures where it can show "justifiable reason" and that placing the initial burden of proof upon that member state
would effectively be penalizing it for exercising that right).
119. See id. at 407 (discussing the Panel's reliance on the prior ruling by the WTO Appellate Body in a
dispute between the United States and India concerning the importation of textiles into the United States); see also
United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, AB-1997-1,
WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Wool Shirts].
120. A Dispute Settlement Panel consists ofthree to five individuals appointed from the member states of the
WTO and include "well-qualified governmental and non-governmental individuals." Jonathan C. Spierer, Dispute
Settlement Understanding:Developing a Firm Foundationfor Implementation of the World Trade Organization,
22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 63,69 (1998).
121. See Sandford, supra,note 113, at 407 (requiring that the claims be sufficiently "substantiated" through
factual and legal arguments when showing a violation of the SPS Agreement).
122. The Dispute Settlement Body f the WTO appoints the members of the Appellate Body. Spierer, supra
note 120, at 77. The representatives, picked from the member countries ofthe WTO, are experienced in international
trade law. Id. The duty of the Appellate Body is to review disputes over lower panel decisions regarding the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT Agreement), which includes the SPS Agreement. Id.
123. See Sandford, supranote 116, at 407 (noting that the terminology used in Wool Shirts concerning the
"presumption" of a violation is synonymous with the establishment of a "prima facie" case).
124. Id. at 408.
125. See Maruyama, supra note 99, at 668 (explaining that Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, which allows
a member to impose higher standards than those recognized internationally where there is scientific justification,
is not an exception to the rule that the burden of proof lies with the complaining party); see also Sandford, supra
note 116, at 409.
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severely undermined by allocating the burden of proof based upon whether a
member conformed to international standards.1 26 Only after a complaining party
establishes a prima facie case of inconsistency with the SPS Agreement, does the
party defending its heightened standards need to show scientific justification for the
adopted measures. 27
2. Scientific Justification
Consistent with the findings of the Codex, scientific studies commissioned by
the EU found that consumption of the treated beef is unlikely to threaten human
health if hormones are administered to cattle in accordance with good animal
husbandry practice.12 8 Despite these findings, the EU tried to justify its ban on
hormone-treated beef
by stating that the scientific studies did not remove all
1 29
possibilities of risk.
The Appellate Body of the WTO upheld the Panel's decision that the basis for
imposing greater restrictions on trade under the SPS Agreement could not be a
policy of "zero risk."130 However, the Appellate Body rejected the Panel's ruling that
a member's standards must "conform" to rather than be "based on" international
31
standards.
The Appellate Body's reading of the SPS Agreement gives a member state a
much broader ability to raise its standards above the level set by international
standards, as long as it possesses sufficient scientific evidence.1 32 This more
generous authority to raise standards is subject to review by dispute settlement

126. See Sandford, supranote 116, at 409 (describing the Appellate Body's determination that the policy of
harmonization of sanitary and phytosanitary measures that guided the creation of Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 of the
SPS Agreement, did not mandate a reversal of the burden of proof, which would establish an exception to a member
state's right to enact heightened standards with "justifiable reasons"); see also Maruyama, supra note 99, at 668
(quoting the Appellate Body as saying, "It is clear... that a decision of a Member not to conform a measure to an
international standard does not authorize the imposition of a generalized or special burden of proof upon that
Member, which may, more often than not amount to a penalty.").
127. See supranote 101 and accompanying text (concerning the requirement of Article 3.3 for "scientific
justification" for heightened SPS measures).
128. See Maruyama, supranote 99, at 667; see also Sandford, supranote 116, at 405 (stating that the various
scientific surveys conducted to research the effects on humans from the residues of hormonal growth promotants
in food showed little health risk).
129. See supra note 111 (noting that the EU did not want to allow hormone-treated beef into the country
because it "might" cause harm).
130. See Maruyama,supranote 99, at 670; see also ECMeasuresConcerningMeat andMeatProductsWTO
Doc.WT/DS26/AB/R, paras. 189, 193 (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Hormones Appeal], available at
http:llwww.wto.orglwto/disputeldistab.htm (stating that there is always some degree of scientific uncertainty about
whether a given substance will ever have adverse health effects and that this fact alone cannot be found to be the
sufficient risk necessary to justify the imposition of trade restrictions).
131. See Maruyama, supra note 99, at 669 (commenting that where a member state's standards "conform"
to international standards, a presumption of their validity under the SPS Agreement is created, but there is no
requirement under the rules that the member state's standards must strictly adhere to international standards).
132. See id. at 670.
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panels and is limited by the requirement that a "rational substantive relationship
exist between the risk assessment'33 and the measure adopted.' 34 A member
does
35
not have to prove that it actually took the risk assessment into account.
A member country need not rely on "mainstream" scientific opinion to establish
sufficient scientific evidence as required by the SPS Agreement, but can rely upon
136
what may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources.
A panel is given a great deal of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient
scientific evidence. 137Further, in rejecting the Panel's distinction between the factors
used to assess a risk and those used to manage a risk, the Appellate Body combined
these factors, allowing consideration of social value judgments to support the
validity of a risk assessment. 138 The Appellate Body stated,
It is essential to bear in mind that the risk to be evaluated in a risk

assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a science
laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in
human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential
for adverse effects
on human health in the real world where people live and
39
work and die.1
Even with a liberal reading of what constitutes sufficient scientific evidence on
which a member country may base its heightened measures, the Appellate Body

133. The SPS Agreement defines "risk assessment" as follows:
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the territory
of an importing Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied,
and of the associated potential biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential
for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants,
toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages, or feedstuffs.
SPS Agreement, supra note 92, art. 5, para. 1.
134. Wirth, supranote 95, at 758; see also HornonesAppeal,supranote 130, at paras. 192-93 & 253(1); see
also Maruyama, supra note 99, at 676 (stating that the SPS standard is not based on sufficient scientific evidence
if it does not bear a rational relationship to the scientific risk assessment that supports it).
135. See Charnovitz, supranote 105, at 915 (stating such a procedural requirement would be "meddlesome
to national decision-making"). If there is a dispute concerning trade restrictive safety measures above international
standards, all that must be shown is that a rational relationship exists. See id.
136. See Hormones Appeal, supra note 130, para. 253() (observing that the use of a divergent source of
scientific information does not in itself indicate the lack of a reasonable relationship between the SPS measure and
the risk assessment, especially where there is perceived risk of a clear and imminent threat to public health and
safety); see also Wirth, supra note 95, at 758.
137. SeeWirth, supranote 95, at 758 (noting that the Appellate Body will not reverse a Panel's determination
of scientific integrity unless the findings amount to a "deliberate disregard of evidence or gross negligence
amounting to bad faith" or "deliberate disregard or distortion of evidence").
138. See Sandford,supranote 116, at413 (observing that the Panel's separation of the "risk assessment" from
"risk management" resulted in stricter guidelines for "sufficient scientific evidence" upon which a member could
base protective measures).
139. Hormones Appeal, supra note 130, para. 187; see also Sandford, supra note 116, at 413 (commenting
that the EU embraced this finding to justify its consideration of consumer concerns in its decision to impose the
restriction on hormone-treated beef).
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found that the EU's ban on hormone-treated beef was not rationally supported."4 In
the process of finding that the EU did not undertake a valid risk assessment as
mandated by Article 5.1, the Appellate Body considered
how the verification of
14 1
acceptable levels of protection should be undertaken.
3. AppropriateLevel ofProtection
The Appellate Body stated that three variables must be shown to determine that
the EU had violated the provisions of Article 5.5 that determine the acceptable
incorporation of appropriate levels of protection. 142 All three of the following
requirements must be met: (1) the member applied different standards of protection
for different situations, (2) the differences between the standards are "arbitrary and
unjustifiable," and (3) the "arbitrary and unjustifiable" differences result in
"discrimination or disguised restriction" on trade. 143 After dismissing the first two
issues in the dispute, 144 the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel and concluded that
the heightened level of protection applied by the EU to hormone-treated beef was
"arbitrary and unjustifiable" because no similar restriction was imposed on the use
of two agricultural chemicals 45 that had similar effects as the hormones. 146 The
Appellate Body did not, however, affirm the Panel's finding that the invalidated
standard was a "disguised restriction on international trade."1 47 The fact that the
Appellate Body did not challenge the Panel's treatment of the factors indicating a
violation, but only challenged the application of the factors to the facts, implies that

140. See Charnovitz, supra note 105, at 915.
141. See Sandford, supranote 116, at 415 (reviewing the Panel's decision regarding the application of Art.
5.5).
142. See supranote 105 (reporting the text of Art. 5.5 of the SPS Agreement that relates to acceptable levels
of protection).
143. Sandford, supranote 116, at 415; see also Maruyama, supranote 99, at 677.
144. First, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's decision that the differences between regulating naturally
occurring hormones in beef cattle from hormones that had been artificially added proved that the restrictions were
arbitrary or unjustified. See Sandford, supra note 116, at 416. The Appellate Body found that there is a
"fundamental distinction" between the two situations and that the intervention necessary to regulate the naturally
occurring hormones in beef would be unacceptable. See id. The second issue concerned the lack of regulation of
hormones administered to cattle for therapeutic reasons. See id. The Appellate Body found that the differences
between the application of hormones for therapeutic reasons and the application of hormones to fatten up the beef
cattle were too great to say that the distinctions were "arbitrary and unjustifiable." See id
145. The EU's lack of restrictions imposed on carbonax and olaquidox allowed unlimited residues of these
known carcinogenic chemicals to be present in beef for consumption. Consequently, the Panel found this to be
evidence of the EU's protectionist intentions, especially when it professed concern for the possibilities that
hormone-treated beef might cause cancer. Maruyama, supra note 99, at 677.
146. See Sandford, supranote 116, at 416-17 (stating that it appears that since the Appellate Body did not
consider ways in which measures mightbe discriminatory toward international trade, a finding that a member state's
measures are "discrimination or disguised restriction[s]" is assessed by the effect that the measures have in
protecting domestic industry).
147. See id.
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a violation will only be found where the application
of the arbitrary measure has a
48
market.1
domestic
the
on
effect
protective
The result of the Appellate Body'sjudgment affirms that a trade restriction must
have a scientific justification and may not otherwise be disguised as a sanitary
measure. 149 Further, even where scientific justification exists to warrant a level of
protection higher than international standards, any restriction imposed may not be
greater than that necessary to protect against the particular risk. 50 The Appellate
Body also concluded that a member state's standards need not "conform to"
international standards.'51 Instead, the Appellate Body upheld a member state's right
to find risks greater than those recognized by international
standards, provided the
52
finding is supported by an objective risk assessment.
The Panel and the Appellate Body both agreed with the EU's argument that the
"precautionary principle"' 5 is embodied within Article 5.715 of the SPS Agreement,
which states that there may be a provisional application of an SPS measure "in cases
where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient."' 55 However, the reviewing bodies
both rejected the EU's invocation of the "precautionary principle."156 Upon finding
that the status of the "precautionary principle" in international law remains
undecided, the Appellate Body refused to rule that a precautionary measure could
override the risk assessment requirements of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 and be7
implemented without sufficient scientific evidence to support its necessity.

148. See id.
149. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 98.
150. See id. (commenting that these limitations upon a member state's ability to impose restrictions at a
heightened level of protection also apply to sanitary measures that existed before the adoption of the SPS
Agreement).
151. See supranote 131 and accompanying text (stating that there is no requirement for a complete adoption
of international standards for food safety regulations).
152. Id. (maintaining that even though the EU's ban on hormone-treated beef was invalidated by the decision
of the relevant dispute settlement bodies of the WTO, that the affirmation of a right to impose higher standards was
an important victory for the EU).
153. See infra notes 156-70 and accompanying text (defining the "precautionary principle").
154. The formulation of the "precautionary principle" as found within the SPS Agreement is as follows:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary
or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the
relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other
Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for
a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within
a reasonable period of time.
SPS Agreement, supra note 92, art. 5, para.7.
155. Hughes, supranote 115, at 931, 932; cf, Maruyama, supra note 99, at 667 (commenting that there may
be an exception under Article 5.7 for provisional regulations where there is scientific uncertainty).
156. Sandford, supranote 116, at 426; see also Wirth, supranote 95, at 758.
157. See Chamovitz, supra note 105, at 913 n.89 (stating that the United States' and Canada's success in
having the "precautionary principle" rejected might backfire on efforts to convince developing countries to prevent
global warming by failing to prevent industrial emissions before irreversible damage results); see also Hughes,
supranote 115, at 918, 919; see also Wirth, supra note 95, at 758-59.
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However, the Appellate Body did not discount the possibility,that the "precautionary
principle" could become a relevant doctrine of international law. 58
IV. THE "PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE"

A. Originand Meaning of the "PrecautionaryPrinciple"
After several years of ineffective regulation, accumulations of toxic substances
contaminated the world's atmosphere, oceans, rivers, and subsequently the tissues
of plants, animals, and humans.1 59 The "precautionary principle" was originally
conceived as a rule to control pollution.160 The basic premise of the principle is that
where there is a "threat of serious or irreversible damage," even in the absence of
clear evidence of harm or risk of harm, governments should take precautions to
61
protect public health and the environment, regardless of the costs of such action.
On a localized level, the "precautionary principle" imposes a substantive duty of
care within a nation or among parties in a regional international agreement; this duty
requires environmental impact assessments or other regulatory investigations before
permitting actions that may be potentially harmful to the environment. 162
On a global level, international obligations impose a duty on nations to avoid
has
damaging the environments of other nations.163 This international duty, however,
64
not been applied where a nation has not taken precautionary measures)
The first significant recognition of the "precautionary principle" as a method of
protecting the environment occurred during the United Nations Conference on

158. Chamovitz, supra note 105, at 913 n.89.
159. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Precaution,Participation,and the "Greening" of hnternationalTrade Law,
7 J. ENVTL. L. & LMG. 57, 61 (1992) (claiming that after the environment becomes polluted, the only effective
response is complete elimination of the source of pollution rather than a mere reduction).
160. See Catherine Tinker, Is a UnitedNations Convention the MostAppropriateMeans to Pursue the Goal
offBiologicalDiversity?:ResponsibilityforBiologicalDiversity ConservationUnderInternationalLaw, 28 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 777, 793 (1995) (discussing the origin of the "precautionary principle" as the international
application of the German law principle of precautionary action (vorsorgeprinzip) and as a duty to avoid risk of
harm).
161. See id. at 793-94 (noting that several United Nations documents advocate the use of the precautionary
principle where there are "threats of serious or irreversible damage" and that a "lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason [to] postpon[e]" preventive action); see also Frank Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the
PrecautionaryPrinciple,53 WASH. &LEEL.REv. 851,851 (1996) (stating that the "precautionary principle" simply
reflects the old saying, "better safe than sorry").
162. See Tinker, supra note 160, at 793 (noting that the imposition of a duty before the occurrence of any
environmental harm could be used as a theory and justification for environmental strict liability which would
compensate victims for harms caused by a lack of precaution).
163. See Tinker, supra note 160, at 797 (commenting that the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 created an
international principle of state responsibility to compensate victims of pollution or other environmental damage).
164. See HormnonesAppeal,supranote 127, para. 123 (statingthatthe"precautionaryprinciple"hasnotbeen
authoritatively accepted as a doctrine of international law); see also Tinker, supra note 160, at 786.
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Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. t65 The Rio Declaration of the
UNCED stated a version of the "precautionary principle" in Principle 15, which
provides that "[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation."1 66 In addition, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) also resulted from the UNCED.' 67 The CBD treaty included the
"precautionary principle" within its preamble, but changed the command "shall" to
"should" and did not limit its guidelines to measures that were "cost-effective" or
68
within the "capabilities" of treaty's signatories.'
The main difference between the CBD's and the Rio Declaration's formulations
of the "precautionary principle" is that the Convention removed from consideration
the cost of precautionary measures in relation to the environmental harm caused, a
major factor in the Rio Declaration. 69 Unlike the Rio Declaration, which would
allow costs to prevent the application of a precautionary measure, the language in
the CBD's treaty would not restrict the "precautionary principle" by economic
factors.170 However, use of the term "should" indicates that the CBD's directive to
take precautionary action is only a guideline and not an absolute command; it is a
suggestion that countries not eschew instituting protective measures because of a
lack of scientific evidence.' 7' There is insufficient proof of the existence of an

165. See Chris W. Backes & Jonathan M. Verschuuren, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in International,
European, andDutch Wildlife Law, 9 COLO. J.INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 43,46 (1998) (commenting that prior to
the UNCED, the "precautionary principle" had only been recognized internationally only for a number of specific
treaties relating to the protection of water quality and the ozone layer).
166. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UConference on Environment and Development,
June 15, 1992, UNCED Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, princ. 15, reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration]; see also Backes & Verschuuren, supranote 165, at 49.
167. See Backes & Verschuuren, supra note 165, at 46.
168. See United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 20, pmbl.,
para. 9 (1993), reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity]; see also RohtArriaza, supra note 154, at 793-94; see also Tinker, supra note 160, at 796 (maintaining that if a treaty uses
"should" and not "shall," a state that violates the treaty provision is not bound and therefore is not liable for the
violation).
169. See Backes & Verschuuren, supra note 165, at 50.
170. Id. at 52.
171. See id. Ajustification for foregoing arequirement of "scientific certainty" is within the language of the
preamble which provides:
Aware of the general lack of information and knowledge regarding biological diversity and of the urgent
need to develop scientific, technical and institutional capacities to provide the basic understanding upon
which to plan and implement appropriate measures,
Noting that it is vital to anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of significant reduction or loss of
biological diversity at source,
Noting also that where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such
athreat ....
Convention on Biological Diversity, supranote 168, at 818-22.
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international rule of law when the language of an international agreement is not
binding nor intended to be binding. 72 Because the CBD treaty is merely a guideline
for the implementation of precautionary measures, no legal duty is imposed upon
states to adhere to the treaty's advice-that precautionary measura "should" be
implemented despite a lack of sufficient scientific evidence if there is some evidence
of possible irreversible harm. t73
B. The CartagenaProtocolof the Convention on BiologicalDiversity
During the last week of January 2000, delegates from 140 countries participated
in the fifth meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological
Diversity 7 4 in Montreal. The Montreal agreement, called the "Cartegena
Protocol," 175 may be a sign that the application of the "precautionary principle" to
the international trade of GMOs is becoming a rule of international law. 176 The
Cartegena Protocol, which opened for signature at the full Convention in Nairobi in
May2000,177 requires exporters of "live" GMOs, termed "LMOs," to obtain advance
permission from the importing country before the initial shipment of the particular
LMO.178 The EU, along with most other countries in the world, successfully

172. See Tinker, supranote 160, at 795 (stating that although states may ratify the language of international
documents, without the intent that the language be binding, ratification is not enough in itself to create international
law); see also id. at 786 (observing that where a state breaches an international duty it accepted as binding through
a treaty, the breach is an "internationally wrongful act" that subjects the state to liability).
173. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (explaining that the language of the CBD treaty does not
create a binding duty to implement the precautionary principle where there is a lack of scientific certainty of harm).
But see Backes & Verschuuren, supranote 165, at 52 (noting that Article 14 of the Biodiversity Convention does
impose a duty to carry out an environmental impact assessment of proposed projects that are likely to cause harm
even though scientific certainty may be lacking).
174. The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity was formed as a multinational effort to preserve
the Earth's biological resources. See Tinker, supranote 160, at 779. Since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro
that spawned the treaty, 176 countries have signed this agreement. See John Burgess, Talks to Open on Divisive
Issue of Gene-Altered Foods, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2000, at A1848.
175. See Bill Lambrecht, Nations OK Pacton GeneticallyModified Foods:TreatyRegulates Technology but
Allows Its Use; Monsanto, GreenpeaceHailAccord,ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2000, at Al (reporting that
the agreement reached in Montreal is called the "Cartagena Protocol" because it is the culmination of five years of
negotiation that started in Cartagena, and when the agreement is officially approved by 50 nations, it will become
part of the Convention of Biological Diversity); see also Pollack, supra note 15, at 1.
176. See Biosafety:MontrealAgreement on Trade in GMOs, EUR. REP., Feb. 2,2000, availableat 2000 WL
8840303.
177. As of September 15, 2000, the "Cartagena Protocol" has been signed by 75 countries and "regional
economic integration organizations" (regional trade agreements). Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Signatures to
the Biosafety Protocolhttp://www.biodiv.orglbiosafe/Protocol/index.html (last modified Sept. 15, 2000).
178. See Pollack, supra note 11, at I (reporting that only "living modified organisms" released into the
environment, such as seeds that are planted or fish that are put into rivers or lakes, must receive permission before
their first introduction into states which are parties to the Agreement). Principle 10 of Annex I of the Montreal
Protocol provides:
No intentional introduction should take place without proper authorization from the relevant national
authority or agency. A risk assessment, including environmental impact assessment, should be carried
out as part of the evaluation process before coming to a decision on whether or not to authorize a
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acquired the right to use the "precautionary principle" for new imports of LMOs. 7 9
The right to restrict the import of LMOs may not rise to the level of a state's duty
to implement precautionary measures, but it does signal a significant shift in the
treatment anci recognition of the "precautionary principle" in international law.' 80
Although the United States has not ratified the original Convention on Biological
Diversity,18 U.S. companies that export to countries participating in the treaty must
comply with the treaty's rules.182 Government officials stated that the United States
will honor the treaty once it is signed.18 3 The United States, in its status as an
observer, led the diplomatic efforts of a group of six of the biggest farm exporters
in the world. 184 One key concession the United States received was that the new
agreement will not affect previous trade agreements adjudicated within the WTO. 85

proposed introduction. States should authorize the introduction of only those alien species that, based
on this prior assessment, are unlikely to cause unacceptable harm to ecosystems, habitats or species, both
within that State and in neighbouring States. The burden ofproof that a proposed introduction is unlikely
to cause such harm should be with the proposer of the introduction. Further, the anticipated benefits of
such an introduction should strongly outweigh any actual and potential adverse effects and related costs.
Authourization of an introduction may, where appropriate, be accompanied by conditions (e.g.,
preparation of a mitigation plan, monitoring procedures, or containment requirements). The
precautionary approach should be applied throughout all the above-mentioned measures.
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and
Technological Advice (SBSTTA), 5th mtg., Annex I, prine. 10, U.N. Doc. UNEPICBDICOPI513 (2000).
179. See Bill Lambrecht, The Deal has been Struck on Gene-Altered Foods, and More Than One Side is
Claiming Victory, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 6,2000,atA14.

180. See id.
181. On June 4, 1993, President Clinton signed the Convention on Biological Diversity,but the United States
still has not ratified the treaty. See Tinker, supra note 160, at 815 n.147 (commenting that President Bush did not
sign the Convention in 1992 because intellectual property rights were not sufficiently protected under the treaty).
As developing countries established domestic regulations that recognized intellectual property rights, the issue lost
much of its importance, as evidenced by the U.S. President's willingness to sign the agreement. See id.; see also
Pollack, supra note 11, at 1.
182. See Pollack, supra note 11, at 1 (noting that the United States cannot become a party to the Cartegena
Protocol because it is not a party to the original Convention on Biological Diversity concluded inRio de Janeiro
in1992).
183. See id.
184. See Burgess, supra note 174,at A8 (reporting that the group of farm exporting nations, called the "Miami
Group," consisted of Canada, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Australia, and the United States).
185. See Lambrecht, supra note 173, at A14 (stating that due to this concession, the treaty will not give
nations unlimited authority to terminate existing agreements, which could potentially restrict
the shipment of
billions
of dollars of genetically modified products that have been previously approved).
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V. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE "PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE"

AND FREE TRADE

In this era of free global trade, trade law has been directly opposed to the
foundation upon which the "precautionary principle" is based. 8 6 Trade restrictions
intended to protect a country's domestic industry have been found to be direct
violations of free trade laws. 87 Critics opposed to the "precautionary principle"
claim that it will in effect contravene the principles of free trade and give other
nations an indiscriminate right to reject biotechnology in the future. 8' Even where
there is sufficient scientific evidence to satisfy international standards, a country
could still conceivably impose precautionary measures simply because it does not
believe the science.'" Under a regulatory scheme that utilizes the "precautionary
principle" for the approval of imported goods, a country may interpose what is
arguably a purely subjective justification for restricting the importation of a product
that cannot be shown to have zero risk.' 90
In an attempt to create a balance between the goals of free trade and respect for
a country's legitimate safety concerns, the WTO Appellate Body in BeefHormones'91 only required that there be a "rational relationship" between the "risk
assessment' 92 and the member state's adopted safety measures.' The EU has
ignored the rationale of this scientifically based principle and has adopted a principle
based on zero risk. 9 4 Under the EU's formulation of safety measures, the reasonable
level of proof required under the Beef-Hormones decision to enact safety measures

186. See Roht-Arriaza, supranote 156, at 63 (remarking that the free trade approach of"grow now, pay later,"
which maintains the need for economic growth before a country will be able and willing to spend on environmental
regulations, will lead to irreversible environmental degradation).
187. See id.at 70 (commenting that a violation may be found even where national regulations treat imported
and domestic products equally because the effect of these regulations incidentally favor the domestic industry).
188. See Lambrecht,supranote 173, atA14 (noting that critics claim that the policy ofprecaution could "take
us back to the 19th century" when no scientific reasons were required to restrict the free trade of genetically
modified products).
189. See id.
190. See Sandford, supra note 116, at 426-27 (stating that the EU's invocation of the "precautionary
principle" in the Beef-Hormones dispute shifted the focus away from the uncertainty of scientific knowledge, upon
which the necessity of the "precautionary principle" was postulated, to a new level based on an aversion to scientific
data); see also supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (explaining that a risk assessment cannot be based on
a requirement that there be a complete absence of risk).
191. See supra notes 115-55 and accompanying text (outlining the findings of the Appellate Body regarding
what is required to restrict the importation of any good under the SPS Agreement and in particular "altered" foods).
192. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (defining the meaning of a "risk assessment" under Article
5.1 of the SPS Agreement).
193. See supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text (noting a member state is not procedurally required to
prove that it "actually" took a "risk assessment" into account when enacting heightened measures, but only that a
"rational relationship" exists between the assessment and the measures).
194. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (reporting the recommendation of the European Council
to amend Directive 90/220 to require the demonstration of no adverse effects before any further GMO may be
authorized to enter the EU market).
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higher than those suggested by international standards is eliminated.' 95 The EU's
justification for adopting the "precautionary principle" is that it allows the
regulatory authorities to take consumers' concerns into account. 96 However, what
drives consumers' concerns is a distrust of the motives of their regulatory
authorities, the honesty of their politicians, and the objectivity of their scientists
rather than fear of any genuine danger created by GMOs. 97 Contrary to the
allocation of the burden of proof among parties in a free market, 98 the
"precautionary principle" requires the placement of the burden of proof upon the
party attempting to introduce a new product into the international market. Requiring
the importing party to show that there is no unacceptable scientific risk, as the
"precautionary principle" requires, may be an insurmountable task where the
importing country is the arbiter of what is acceptable. 99 The ability of a country to
arbitrarily deny the import of a good, regardless of the validity of any scientific
evidence as to the safety of the product, is of great concern to the United States due
to the enormity of the United States' commitment to the production of GMO
crops. 200 Beyond the dispute over the trade of GMOs, use of the "precautionary
principle," which lacks the requirement of scientific justification to support a trade
restriction, may undermine the incentive to develop any technological advancements
in the production of food by restricting access to the global market.2 '

195. See supra notes 125-23 and accompanying text (mentioning the Appellate Body's opinion that in
deference to the right ofa member state to choose its own "appropriate level of protection," which is a vital part of
the SPS Agreement, after a complaining party establishes a prima facie case, the sole requirement of proof for the
member state is to show a "relationship" between the heightened measures and the risk assessment).
196. See Nelson, supranote 12, at 58 (explaining that because of a lack of public confidence in government
and government-sponsored science, the EU is not willing to test its credibility with the European people by
endorsing the acceptance of GMOs); see also Stewart & Johanson, supra note 36, at 294 (questioning whether the
EU is protecting its consumers' genuine concerns about GMO products or whether its recently enacted policies are
only a political reaction to public fears following the "mad cow disease" scare).
197. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 73 (stating that only 25% of people surveyed trusted their national
governments or EU authorities to tell them the truth about their food supply); see also supra notes 4-8 and
accompanying text (referring to the confusion generated by the variety of safety standards among the EU and the
national governments that comprise the EU).
198. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 159, at 65 (remarking that in a free trade context, e.g., the GAIT
Agreement, the burden of proof is upon the party defending the enactment of a protective measure (i.e., Europe)
to show that the measure is necessary and supported by a provable risk to human, animal, or plant health); see also
supraPart Il.B.1. (reporting that the Appellate Body decision in the Beef-Hormones dispute required that after a
prima faie case demonstrating a violation of the SPS Agreement is established, a showing of sufficient scientific
evidence to support a risk assessment must be proven before a trade restriction in excess of the protection mandated
by international standards can be imposed).
199. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 79 (describing the viewpoint that if restrictions are based on adverse
consumer reaction, rather than a system of scientific justification that is understandable, transparent, and reasonably
constant, protectionism may be unavoidable).
200. See supranotes 9-11 and accompanying text (commenting on the economic significance of the trade
relationship between the United States and the EU).
201. See Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe:Assessing the PrecautionaryPrincipleandthe Proposed
International Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEx. INT'L L.J. 173, 204 (2000) (stating that use of the "precautionary
principle" results in domestic protectionism that undermines the international trade necessary to promote the
economic growth needed to support both technological development and a "willingness-to-pay" for environmental
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VI. CONCLUSION

The EU's adoption of the "precautionary principle" for GMOs resulted in the
principle being included within a world-wide treaty. The adoption of the
"precautionary principle" is an overreaction to the public's resistance to GMOs,
which is a result of the public's distrust of science and governmental regulation. The
answer is not to adopt a vague system of regulation that may inevitably lead to
protectionism, but to build the public's trust in a system with a clear set of standards
based on science. The present system of regulation under the SPS Agreement works,
but in order to gain the public's trust from the outset, there must be complete and
open public involvement in the implementation of the system. An open market
benefits all participants, but a nation must have the right to restrict trade when there
may be a risk to its people and its environment. The risk, however, cannot be
supported by unfounded fears resulting from unrelated tragedies, such as mad-cow
disease 02 or the unlawful administration of hormones to veal.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated:
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great,
not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but
because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which
appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests
exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was
clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law
will bend. °3
Such is the case here where concerns for consumers' fears are being used to create
a regulatory system for global trade that cannot simultaneously achieve the goal of
free trade. The argument may not be so much about what constitutes sufficient
science to protect the world's environment or human health as it is about how far a
nation may go to protect its own market.

protection), Examples of the benefits derived from GMOs include the decrease in the use of pesticides for, and the
increased productivity derived from, the reduction in crop damage of Bt corn due to its pest-resistant attributes. See
id. at 200. Also, the improved nutrition of some GMOs increases the ability of these foods to efficiently feed the
world. Id. In order to meet the demands of a world population that will reach 10 billion this century, an alternative
to using GMOs to increase agricultural productivity may be to increase the amount of cropland utilized. See id. at
201-02. However, the loss of habitat resulting from conversions of undeveloped land including the world's forests
into cropland, is a continuing harm to the environment and may result in the extinction of at least one quarter of the
species alive today. See id. at 201.
202. See supra note 2 (explaining "mad-cow disease" and the suspected link between the epidemic and the
practice of feeding cattle the ground-up remains of sheep and other cattle).
203. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

